Christian Ethics and Natural Law
By Philip R. Olsson
I've been invited to talk today about religion in America from
the standpoint of a philosophical
theologian. And if
you’ve not asked the question before, you may be asking it now – what is a philosophical
theologian? Is that a quirky, depraved sort of creature? …
Well, at the risk of correcting… such an impeccably accurate observation… by flattering
the species to which Providence has assigned me…, I suggest that we think of the
philosophical theologian as the Sherlock
Holmes of Theology. … While flipping through the volumes of
both the living and the dead, he monitors traffic at the intersection of
Transcendent Divinity and Conceptual Analysis…being alert to any intriguing characters that may appear.
Today, I’m
going to talk to you about one such character…what’s
known as the Natural Law approach to ethics. Natural Law ethics is an intellectual enterprise whose
advocates have included the ancient Stoics,
the medieval scholar Thomas Aquinas,
and a hodgepodge of post-Renaissance Catholic,
Protestant, and even Secular Moralists. Admittedly, given such a mixed pedigree of the
Natural Law tradition as it comes to us, an examination and evaluation of
Natural Law ethics might not, in the judgment of some, exactly belong in
a discussion of religion. Even
more might this be thought… when we realize
that Natural Law theorists have typically sought to derive moral norms or rules from descriptive
characterizations of man’s nature, behavior, or both. This, rather
than, … or at least in addition to a
more scripturally specific study of the Creator’s prescribed will for human
flourishing. …
Whatever Natural
Law is, however, it’s definitely the kind of animal that interests
philosophical theologians. After
all, a persistent – though certainly not universal – habit of those favoring a Natural Law
approach has been to trace something like unregenerate conscience, for example – to the concept of a socially
engaged divine judge. And
if the latter doesn’t count as a religious concept, then exactly none of us knows what a religious
concept is.
Natural
Law, though…do we know what it is? Coming from
someone skeptical about this approach (such as myself), this may sound like the
64 thousand dollar rhetorical question.
Snarkiness aside,… I’ve already indicated that Natural Law advocates
have sought to affirm a kind of “ethical court of appeals” – a court that
doesn’t, at the end of the day, merely bow to human intuitions and behavioral
customs. The latter, after all, are
capable of changing from one generation
to the next and varying from one person
to the next. ……
Now, as we’ll see, the commitment
to an unwavering, universal moral standard is not unique to Natural Law theory. However, what has been
a unique and ubiquitous mark of this school of thought – in both its theistic…
and non-theistic incarnations – is the desire for a moral middle way -- a
moral middle way -- between
the details of scriptural commandments in
one direction and, say, Friedrich Nietzsche’s efforts to step Beyond Good and Evil in the other. A Natural Law ethics is possible, or so it’s been said, because the world contains things that are hard-wired with their
own distinct natures and
because humans are able to discover the governing concepts or principles implicit in some of these natures – in particular – human nature …and thereby acquire guidance…without reference
to the details of a Holy Book or Set of Stone Tablets.
With another
nod toward our topic, we can move on
by noting two 20th century American defenders of Natural Law ethics,… both of whom reckoned that there are
some fundamental moral truths… and that these may be apprehended without making
recourse to scriptural revelation.
On one hand, the great economist Murray Rothbard, in his work The Ethics of Liberty, praised Thomas
Aquinas and his followers for “vindicating the independence of philosophy from
theology, and proclaiming the ability of man’s reason to understand and
arrive at the laws physical and ethical, of the natural order.” He then moved things along a strongly individualistic
trajectory, developing the moral framework for a laissez-faire political
philosophy. He called it anarcho-capitalism. On the other hand, we have the Catholic philosopher Jacques Maritain who, likewise,
held that there is a Natural Law. In his view, we’re acquainted with this Law directly – as a brute given
of experience – and natural rights are
rooted in it. Yet Maritain’s
thought took a much more collectivistic trajectory than Rothbard’s. In his
view, we do not go astray, for example, when we permit State bureaucrats to impose wage controls or guarantee an annual income to citizens by way of coercive regulation and taxation.
Now, I
believe that the variance in what these theories principally require and permit…
likely points to some fundamental problems with Natural Law ethics as a
programme for moral philosophy. But this is not because Rothbard and
Maritain are mistaken to claim a sort of general access humans have to a set of
moral requirements. I don’t
believe they are mistaken in this.
Nor is it because those who agree about general principles can never disagree at the point of application. People may differ, for instance, over
the logical inferences they draw from
those principles… or over the supposed facts
of a situation in which they would apply them. So, I don’t question that people can agree on a general
principle and differ over its application(s). …
In turning
to evaluate this issue, …I can’t stress enough that all Christians are called
to a prophetic ministry on Christ’s behalf within our
individual spheres of influence. Moreover,
we’re equipped with a Spirit-awakened understanding and the canon of Holy
Scripture, enabling us to carry out
that ministry as agents of the New Creation. This being said, I’ll put forth a general claim for your
consideration. ….Here it is: The Moral Law that
Scripture indicates we naturally know acquires
neither added force, nor added content, nor any other supposed advantage…from
those who would either pare down what
Scripture says about the Law and its reception (especially by unbelievers) or seek
to add a supplemental theory about such matters to the scriptural specifics.
… In line with this claim…I’ll spend the remainder of this paper sketching a
case against the Christian endorsement of Natural Law ethics as an approach to
moral thinking. When I’m through,
it’s my hope that you’ll be pleased to affirm the following three propositions:
1.
Firstly, Natural Law thinkers are, in important
respects, admirable for their resistance to our recent secular and pragmatic
heritage. They call us back to an idealistic
perspective. Acknowledging that people sometimes differ with each other in their moral
judgments and that individuals will
sometimes act against their own better knowledge, Natural Lawyers set forth a form
of moral realism, coupled with the
idea that all people have some sort of primitive
access to the non-negotiable principles of the moral order. …
2.
Secondly, Christians
ought to agree that we cannot justify dispensing with either moral realism or with this idea that humans
have a sort of primitive access to
the moral rules…for the simple reason…that the Bible warrants a belief in both. …
3.
Thirdly, however, I’ll maintain that Christians, on
one hand, do not stand to help and,
on the other hand, may very well be
undermining their Christian witness when they commend Natural Law as a,
more or less, autonomous guide in matters pertaining to moral reasoning, apologetics,
or civil jurisprudence.
The first
two of these propositions…I’ll touch on only briefly… in order …more carefully
to ratify and commend the third.
With
respect to the first, let me initially say that the idea of Natural Law, as a
distinct component of the Western Christian moral and legal complex for at
least 800 years, has often played a virtuous
formal role in American religious
and social discourse. Even today, some parts of the American body politic still sip at the dregs of
this medieval (and even Ancient, if one counts the Stoics)…moral residue…a residue that allowed the barely Anglican and quite
deistic, Thomas Jefferson, to shake off British paternalism in the name of “the
laws of nature and…Nature’s God.”
In my
judgment, the proponents of Natural Law ethics have displayed at least two distinct virtues in articulating a
moral philosophy:
For one, again,
they’ve given us a form of moral realism,
the view that moral claims can be true or false and that some are true. In rejecting the notion that morality
is a purely human phenomenon, they affirm that it has, in the words of H.G.
Robinson, “an indefeasible, trans-human reference, a reference beyond all
actual men and empirical groups to which they belong… by which both men and
groups are, in some sense, finally judged.”
As such, Natural Law theorists repudiate what some have referred to as the “voluntarist” assumptions that have prevailed in much of Western moral thought since the Enlightenment. That is to say, they embrace a conception of universal duty, as opposed to those who’ve held that moral rules are esoteric in character, binding only as a set of “house rules,” if you will, and laying no obligations on those outside of a particular sub-set of the human community.
As such, Natural Law theorists repudiate what some have referred to as the “voluntarist” assumptions that have prevailed in much of Western moral thought since the Enlightenment. That is to say, they embrace a conception of universal duty, as opposed to those who’ve held that moral rules are esoteric in character, binding only as a set of “house rules,” if you will, and laying no obligations on those outside of a particular sub-set of the human community.
Importantly
tied to this espousal of moral realism
has been the conviction that humans, in virtue of their humanity, are blessed
with a sort of primitive access to or
natural knowledge of the requirements of morality. Theorists have given different answers
to questions about whether the Natural Law is known immediately (i.e., through
experience), mediately (i.e., upon reflection), or both. They’ve also sometimes differed over
the nature
and specificity of the Higher Law.
Does it convey concrete rules such as: Don’t commit any non-retaliatory acts of violence? Or does it amount to something more general like: Do what’s proper. ? Regardless, the proponents have been united in the belief that humans have the requirements of the Law impressed upon them thanks to some integral features of their being… and engagement in the world. Natural Law has thus been generally said to constitute a moral compass… independent of… and, in a sense, prior to… any exposure one may have to a particular culture… or religious tradition.
Does it convey concrete rules such as: Don’t commit any non-retaliatory acts of violence? Or does it amount to something more general like: Do what’s proper. ? Regardless, the proponents have been united in the belief that humans have the requirements of the Law impressed upon them thanks to some integral features of their being… and engagement in the world. Natural Law has thus been generally said to constitute a moral compass… independent of… and, in a sense, prior to… any exposure one may have to a particular culture… or religious tradition.
Now,
as my second proposition states, Christians ought to have no quarrel with either
of these features – moral realism
and a universal human acquaintance with
the Law’s requirements. In the
early chapters of his letter to the Romans, the Apostle Paul presents the human
need for a Spirit-wrought justification against a background of universal
guilt.
The latter presupposes not only a single standard of judgment but also a universal knowledge of it sufficient to render people accountable to divine justice. The unredeemed heirs of the Adamic covenant stand guilty of breaking the Law because, in short, they’ve acted contrary to their better knowledge of it. The Trinity’s self-disclosure in creation thus precludes the viability of what we might call agnostic apologetics. What we ought to conclude from these observations… is merely that one may logically affirm a universal, “natural” awareness of the Moral Law without buying into any sort of Natural Law theory …whether that theory be about how the Law’s demands might be known or even…heaven forbid… how those demands may be seen to have obligatory force independent of the Trinitarian revelation. Again, all Natural Law theories appear to affirm both of these features – an absolute Moral Law and some type of universal awareness of it – but it does not follow from an affirmation of these features, taking them either alone or together, that one is thereby committed to some version of Natural Law theory. … However,… what about scripturally? Regardless of what’s logically possible, does Scripture provide any warrant for attaching some version of Natural Law theory – say, for apologetic purposes – to the Christian’s intellectual armor?
The latter presupposes not only a single standard of judgment but also a universal knowledge of it sufficient to render people accountable to divine justice. The unredeemed heirs of the Adamic covenant stand guilty of breaking the Law because, in short, they’ve acted contrary to their better knowledge of it. The Trinity’s self-disclosure in creation thus precludes the viability of what we might call agnostic apologetics. What we ought to conclude from these observations… is merely that one may logically affirm a universal, “natural” awareness of the Moral Law without buying into any sort of Natural Law theory …whether that theory be about how the Law’s demands might be known or even…heaven forbid… how those demands may be seen to have obligatory force independent of the Trinitarian revelation. Again, all Natural Law theories appear to affirm both of these features – an absolute Moral Law and some type of universal awareness of it – but it does not follow from an affirmation of these features, taking them either alone or together, that one is thereby committed to some version of Natural Law theory. … However,… what about scripturally? Regardless of what’s logically possible, does Scripture provide any warrant for attaching some version of Natural Law theory – say, for apologetic purposes – to the Christian’s intellectual armor?
Briefly,
I’d like you to consider some reasoning that should incline us toward a negative answer to this query.
First,
I would refer to Scripture’s locus classicus
when it comes to dealing with the subject of an innate knowledge of God and His
holy requirements…Romans 1:18-32. Initially,
let’s ask this question:
Does Paul, in the Romans passage or elsewhere, encourage us, by way of his own example, to limit our counsel to unbelievers – say, in relation to apologetics or discussions of civil jurisprudence – to what even an ethnically and religiously homogeneous group of humans may agree upon? … I think the clear answer to this is NO. … On one hand, the Apostle to the Gentiles, in line with the Old Covenant prophets, appears fully capable and sometimes willing… to submit those outside the Church to the ethical scrutiny of Israel’s Law-giver (See, for example, his reference to the sword-wielding magistrate as Christ’s minister of wrath against wrong-doers in Romans 13). On the other hand, he is centrally occupied with instructing and edifying the household of faith, and gives no indication that counseling unbelievers, shy of a call to conversion, is anywhere on his agenda. He’s working with God’s covenant-elect people, those New Creatures who’ve been freed from the Law’s curse to abound in love and wisdom. … Now, these observations, of course, support no hard and fast conclusions with respect to Natural Law. But I find them conveniently consistent with a thesis I find tempting. The thesis, set forth by the Ethics Professor, Oliver O’Donavan, states that there is, indeed, a natural moral order but that a true understanding of it can only be achieved in Christ. While this certainly opens up space for the “Creational ethics” he presents in his book Resurrection and Moral Order, it signifies an abandonment of the Natural Lawyer’s quest for a moral middle way.
Does Paul, in the Romans passage or elsewhere, encourage us, by way of his own example, to limit our counsel to unbelievers – say, in relation to apologetics or discussions of civil jurisprudence – to what even an ethnically and religiously homogeneous group of humans may agree upon? … I think the clear answer to this is NO. … On one hand, the Apostle to the Gentiles, in line with the Old Covenant prophets, appears fully capable and sometimes willing… to submit those outside the Church to the ethical scrutiny of Israel’s Law-giver (See, for example, his reference to the sword-wielding magistrate as Christ’s minister of wrath against wrong-doers in Romans 13). On the other hand, he is centrally occupied with instructing and edifying the household of faith, and gives no indication that counseling unbelievers, shy of a call to conversion, is anywhere on his agenda. He’s working with God’s covenant-elect people, those New Creatures who’ve been freed from the Law’s curse to abound in love and wisdom. … Now, these observations, of course, support no hard and fast conclusions with respect to Natural Law. But I find them conveniently consistent with a thesis I find tempting. The thesis, set forth by the Ethics Professor, Oliver O’Donavan, states that there is, indeed, a natural moral order but that a true understanding of it can only be achieved in Christ. While this certainly opens up space for the “Creational ethics” he presents in his book Resurrection and Moral Order, it signifies an abandonment of the Natural Lawyer’s quest for a moral middle way.
Pressing
a bit further, we can ask whether the Apostle, in any other way,
encourages those in Christ to derive divine requirements from an ideal concept
of human nature or human flourishing not deducible from Scripture. And to this I answer that I hardly
think so. For one thing, he gives no indication that he’s involved in an enterprise
– divinely established or not – through which knowledge may be accumulated
about the moral dictates, say, of a pagan’s conscience. He’s rather a messenger of the divine
revelation. On a similar note, we
are provided details that are meager at
best regarding how it is that unbelievers know of God’s requirements. Most notably, in Romans chapter 1, Paul
is involved in giving a descriptive profile of those who are strangers to the covenants
of promise. Under the illumination
of the Spirit, he’s showering the
saints with an understanding of the idolatrous and deluded state in which
covenant-strangers are found. But
it’s important to see that he does this as a sort of prelude and buildup to
everything else that follows. His
purpose isn’t to dwell on and counsel covenant-strangers. He’s about proclaiming the Holy
Spirit’s invasion of Planet Earth, expounding upon what the Shepherd’s done for the Sheep, and indicating
consequences this has for Sheeply living. Starting in verse 29, he writes:
“They
were filled with all manner of unrighteousness, evil, covetousness, malice.
They are full of envy, murder, strife, deceit, maliciousness. They are gossips,
30 slanderers,
haters of God, insolent, haughty, boastful, inventors of evil, disobedient to
parents, 31 foolish, faithless, heartless, ruthless. 32 Though they know God's
righteous decree that those who practice such things deserve to die, they not
only do them but give approval to those who practice them.”
This information certainly has spiritual
value for Christians, as it exhorts them to give thanks for the grace they’ve
received in salvation. … It also has evangelistic value…because it
provides clarity about the unbeliever’s confounded
circumstances. Without ranging
beyond the passage just quoted, I think we can safely infer that the persons
described here carry with them a tacit knowledge of the Moral Law and that they
are, in some sense, guided by it. But
does it follow from this that
unbelievers are, as such, properly guided
or even sufficiently restrained in
their sin? By no means. Nor does it follow,
I would argue, that Christians
should refrain from being guided by scriptural specifics in all aspects of their lives.
Speaking
of specifics, chew for a moment on the specificity of that catalog of vices I
just read, especially focusing on that phrase “haters of God.” Paul believes that even those ignorant
of the Scriptures know that those cultivating a hostility toward God are “worthy
of death.” Now, do we… being finite, sinful people…
actually hope to confirm what Paul’s getting at here without returning, like
the prodigal son, to the scriptural testimony? Is that something we can manage our own steam? Affirmative answers to these questions
appear to have both grave and significant implications. For wouldn’t Scripture, then, be forced
to pass a sort of “screening procedure”?
And wouldn’t this do violence to the doctrine of its sufficiency?
These last
thoughts express a skepticism about
the quest for a Natural Law theory that I
believe deserves serious consideration. …
In that American classic… Disney’s Pinocchio, I was recently reminded, Jiminy Cricket melodically instructs the marionette to always let his conscience be his guide. And we may surely count this as good advice. But in doing so, let’s not sanitize the situation as Disney does. In the book version of the story…it’s worth noting, our sweet little wooden protagonist at one point takes up a mallet and proceeds to smash his pesky conscience – Jiminy – to death. What that boyish assembly of depraved lumber ultimately needed, we’ll agree, was to become a real boy. And…barring some heavenly wand-waiving, we should not expect that the prophetic voice of the Christian will be more warmly received than is the Law the Natural Man already knows. But the devastation that accompanies the fool’s folly, especially when viewed in contrast to the riches Scripture has to offer, does not permit us to shrink down the principles of wisdom and justice to something no more informative or articulate than a bruised and battered Jiminy Cricket. Thank you.
In that American classic… Disney’s Pinocchio, I was recently reminded, Jiminy Cricket melodically instructs the marionette to always let his conscience be his guide. And we may surely count this as good advice. But in doing so, let’s not sanitize the situation as Disney does. In the book version of the story…it’s worth noting, our sweet little wooden protagonist at one point takes up a mallet and proceeds to smash his pesky conscience – Jiminy – to death. What that boyish assembly of depraved lumber ultimately needed, we’ll agree, was to become a real boy. And…barring some heavenly wand-waiving, we should not expect that the prophetic voice of the Christian will be more warmly received than is the Law the Natural Man already knows. But the devastation that accompanies the fool’s folly, especially when viewed in contrast to the riches Scripture has to offer, does not permit us to shrink down the principles of wisdom and justice to something no more informative or articulate than a bruised and battered Jiminy Cricket. Thank you.